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524 524 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. that the same ought to be true of a contract to convey. Such a view can be supported only on the theory that the transfer of land so closely concerns the State where it is situated that all contracts relating thereto must conform to its law. It is on this prin- ciple that actions of trespass to real property are not allowed outside of the State where the act was committed. See Story, Conflict of Laws, §§ 554, 555. But there would seem to be no advantage in holding to such a strict rule. Husband and wife are allowed in Massachusetts to bring about the result they desire by a conveyance to trustees on trusts properly limited. What is objectionable in decreeing specific performance of the same act .? Constitutional Law — Equal Protection of the Law. — The State of Texas passed a statute, providing that, if a railroad corporation should fail to pay claims for less than $50, within thirty days after presentation, such corporation should be liable for an attorney's fee of ^10, provided the claim w^as supported by affidavit and was prosecuted to a successful termination in the courts. Held, the stat- ute is unconstitutional in that it denies to railroad companies the equal protection of the law. Fuller, C. J., Gray and White, J. J., dissenting. Gulf, C, <5t^ S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255. This would seem to be an unfortunate decision. The doctrine of the United States Supreme Court in this class of cases is that class legislation is not unconstitutional so long as it rests on some reasonable basis and affects all persons alike within the sphere of its operation. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 ; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205. This is admitted by the majority of the court, but they rest their decision on the ground that the statute in this particular case is wholly arbitrary and unreason- able. Such a view is extraordinarily narrow. The legislation in question simply con- cerned costs in certain civil actions, and, as is pointed out by Gray, J., in his dissenting opinion, costs have always been a legitimate subject for legislative action. See Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81. Further than this, as there is nothing in the statute to show that the legislature was acting from wrong motives, it may well be that it appeared to that body that the railroads were unduly resisting the payment of small claims. If that were so, (and it was entirely a question for the legislature to decide,) then its action in the present case cannot be called arbitrary class legislation. Statutes to the same effect have been upheld in the State courts. Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 111. 339; Cameron v. R. R. Co., 65 N. W. Rep. 652 (Minn.) ; R. R. Co. v. L>ey, 82 Iowa, 312. The principal case is also interesting in deciding that a corporation is a " person," within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. There have been many dicta to that effect, but few, if any, decisions. Constitutional Law — Insurance Policy — Exemption from Debt. — A statute providing that a policy of life insurance, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, shall inure to the benefit of husband or wife independently of creditors, and that an endowment policy payable to the assured, on the attainment of a certain age, shall be exempt from liability for his debts, held to violate a constitutional provision exempt- ing from forced sale " a reasonable amount of personal property, the kind and value of which is to be fixed by general laws." Skinner v. Hoyt, 69 N. W. Rep. 595 (N. Dak.). This decision is a wholesome one, and, from the similarity of such exemption clauses in various State constitutions, is of considerable interest. The tendency of some of our Western legislatures has been to pass laws far too generous to debtors to be just. A com- paratively recent decision to the same effect is How v. How, 61 N. W. Rep. 456 (Minn.). Constitutional Law — Thirteenth Amendment. — The Revised Statutes provide that deserting seamen may be taken before a justice of the peace and by him committed to jail, to be delivered to the master on the sailing of the vessel, or sooner on demand. Held, that these provisions are constitutional. Robertson v. Baldwin^ 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326. See Notes. Contracts — Gaming — Recovery of Money Loaned to Pay Losses. — Where a member of a club was interested in the " take out " from all bets made in a poker game played in the club rooms, to the extent that such " take out " was used in paying for the expenses of the club and the purchase of drinks and meals for the members, held he is such a participant in the game, though not an actual player, as to prevent his recovery of money paid out at the request of another member in settlement of his losses at the game. White v. Wilson's Adm'rs, 38 S. W. Rep. 495 (Ky.). In general, money loaned to pay for losses at cards, after the losses have been in- curred, is recoverable. Mc Kinney v. Pope's AdmWs, 3 B. Mon. 93. But, as in the principal case, where the parties are in pari delicto, the rule is otherwise. Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 268. Although it seems rather a refinement to say that the defendant