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492 4Q2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. and to the performance of its duty. In punishing crimes and mis- demeanors, and in adjudicating between citizens, it is therefore but obeying its organic duty and enforcing its organic right, as these are defined by the law of reciprocity. No state fails utterly in this function. To a greater or less extent, with a greater or less degree of intelligence, and with a greater or less approximation to the ethical standard, every community that ever existed has admin- istered some form of justice, and maintained some forum for its administration. Indeed, there is no criterion wherel^y to judge the progress of a community in civilization which is more funda- mentally sound than the success it has attained in the administra- tion of justice. The ethical law is thus at once the reason of the municipal law and the substance of its commands. Ideal justice would obtain were the state able to lend its sanc- tion to the ethical law in its entirety ; but that is obviously impos- sible. It is still true, however, that the state should proceed in its duty so far as its powers will permit, and this is substantially recognized in the maxims of the law. Ubi jus, ibi remeditini} In any new case, therefore, the investigation into the limits of law should properly resolve itself, supposing the ethical status to be clearly ascertained, into an investigation of the limits of judicial power. In view of these considerations, I venture to hazard this definition : Municipal law is the command of society through its constituted authorities y founded upon the ethical law of reciprocity as the reason of its command, and, to the exte?tt of its power, re-ejiacting that law as the standard of conduct for its citizens.'^ ^ An interesting and perhaps the latest case indicating that this is the just attitude of the courts is Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176. ^ It will be observed that this definition approaches very closely to the definition of Blackstone, " a rule of conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, command- ing what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." i Comm. 44. The criticism of Christian upon the final clause of this definition, that, if right and wrong are referred to law, the proposition is tautological, and that, if they are referred to an external stan- dard, it is not true in fact, since the law prohibits many things that ethically are right, will occur to every reader. 1 Comm. 44 (Sharswood's ed.), n. 8. This criticism j)ro- ceeds upon a probably mistaken notion of the meaning of the obnoxious clause. What Blackstone probably intended to indicate by it is the general command of the muni- cipal law to be ethical, which necessarily accords with the ethical law. He probably did not intend its particular commands to do or not to do particular acts, — commands which may not be, and in fact often are not, ethically right. It is this general com- mand which my own definition is intended to indicate. I have added the clause pressing more fully the rational nature of the command, and have used the phrase •* society through its constituted authorities," instead of " the supreme power in the
 * founded upon the ethical law of reciprocity as the reason of its command," as ex-