Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/511

Rh tion of conformance. To be the basis of moral theory it must be applied to morally responsible beings; to beings, that is, endowed with a freedom of initiative. It cannot, therefore, as to them be a rule of necessitated action. Moreover, it cannot without proof be assumed to be a rule of obligatory action, because that involves the unverified assumption of the existence of a moral obligation. It is true that obedience to the principle of reciprocity is essential to the maintenance of the social order, and even, in a large aspect, to the existence both of the individual and of society; but to prove so much is to prove simply that reciprocity is a mere condition from which the utmost inference that can be drawn is that it is to the interest of society and of its members to conform to their conditions of existence. It is an invalid inference that such conformance is obligatory. If individuals refuse to conform, they will, to be sure, their own destruction and the destruction of society; but there is nothing in mere reciprocal dependence to forbid their willing such destruction, except the destruction itself. There has been much misconception on this matter, and in many ethical theories, notably the utilitarian, the effort to convert a mere mutual dependence between individuals, without more, into an obligation of altruism has been most strenuous. It has been a fruitless task, however, and those who have tried it have not permanently satisfied the demands of reason. Unless therefore more inheres in this relation than has yet appeared, neither the necessity nor the obligation of conformance obtains with respect to the conditions of reciprocity. A more careful inquiry into the nature of law is necessary.

In a mere static universe, wherein all things should be fixed and nothing should change, an intelligence of sufficient capacity might supposably discern certain formal relations, such as those of position, number, and likeness; but these are all that could be discerned, and all that would be intelligible. No one form of such a universe would be more intelligible than another. Even if it were arranged in an order of stellar systems, with suns, moons, and planets, with perhaps forms of trees, mounitains, and temples, these would be no more intelligible than irregular forms for which no name exists. There would be only these spatial and numerical relations, which could be as easily measured in the one case as in the other. Such a universe, however, could not in any part of it be seen, or heard, or tasted, or perceived by any physical sense,