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442 442 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. therefore be upheld, as the statute is severable. This exact point does not appear to be discussed very fully in the majority opinion. The case is very similar to Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, in which the same result was reached. But in all questions of interstate commerce, where the relative powers of the States and the Federal government are involved, the true rule, in point of principle, would seem to be for the courts to decline to interfere, unless the State statute be arbitrary or partial, or touch subjects which clearly require one uniform system throughout the country, leaving to Congress its legitimate function of revising, in whatever way it sees fit, such State legislation. See 10 Harvard Law Review, 378. The Present Constitution of the Principal Courts of Eng- land. — The interest attaching to the recent promotion of the Hon. Sir Joseph William Chitty from the Chancery Division to the Court of 'Appeal suggests that a few words concerning the English courts may not be out of place. Since 1873 the judicial system of England has been so radically and so frequently amended that to many its present arrangement is largely matter of conjecture. The Supreme Court of Judicature is the collective name applied to Her Majesty's High Court of Justice and Her Majesty's High Court of Appeal. The former is a court of original jurisdiction, and is composed of three divisions. These are the Queen's Bench, Chancery, and Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divisions. The first consists of a President, who is the Lord Chief Justice of England, and fourteen puisne judges ; the second is composed of five judges ; a President and a single associate form the third. The divisions are made merely for convenience, as each court has all the powers and jurisdiction of the others ; that is, a chancery judge may probate a will if he wishes, but refrains from con- siderations of expediency. Though appointed to a particular division, any judge may sit and act in any of the three courts. These provisions are the result of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, ^ vci object of which was the fusion of law and equity. The title of a judge is not derived from his own division, but is Justice of the High Court. The other division of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Appeal, consists of the Master of the Rolls, who is now judge of appeal only, and whose title is entirely dissociated from its historical significance ; five judges with the title of Lords Justices of Appeal, and the following ex officio members : the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of Eng- land, the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, and all ex-Chancellors. The Court of Appeal sits in two divisions, from one to the other of which the judges constantly change. From this court their lies an appeal to the House of Lords, which may be heard only when at least three Lords of Appeal are present. The Lords of Appeal are the Lord Chancellor, any member who holds or has held high judicial office, this signifying ex-Chancellors and judges and ex-judges of Her Majesty's High Courts, and four Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. These last are life peers with the title of Baron, appointed for the purpose of strengthening the House of Lords as a court. Final appeals from the Colonies and in ecclesiastical matters are sent to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This committee is composed of the Lord Presi- dent of the Council, any member who holds or has held high judicial