Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/467

Rh verdict. Not to require unanimity in criminal cases, however, strikes one as of doubtful propriety. Yet there would seem to be no constitutional difficulty, apart from special provisions in State constitutions, that does not exist equally in civil cases. If sounder verdicts are to rwsult in civil cases, why not also in criminal? Such a trial is arbitrary in both or in neither. However, before advocating the change in criminal cases it would be better to have it demonstrated by experience that good results do follow in civil cases.

. — The Dispensary Law of South Carolina has just been declared unconstitutional in Scott v. Donald, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. This measure has attracted attention throughout the country by reason of its many novel features. Furthermore, the name of its well known author, Senator Tillman, has served to invest the law with an unusual amount of popular interest. The statute in question was peculiar in several respects. It did not purport to prohibit entirely the manufacture and sale of intoxicants, buit placed the complete control of this business in the hands of the State. The essential provisions of the law were, that retail sales of liquor should be made only by certain dispensers authorized by the State; that these dispensers slhould be supplied by the State commissioner; that the comnmissioner should purchase from the manufacturers, and submit all liquor so purchased to the State chemist for examination; and niot until the liquor had been pronounced pure and so labelled was the commissioner permitted to distribute it for selling purposes amnong the dispensers. No one except the commissioner could buy either from persons within or without the State, unless such persons were dispensers. In his purchases the commissioner was required to give to home produicers the preference over those of other States. The profits of the trade were to be divided between the State and the different counties.

The opinion of the majority of the court, in an exhaustive review of all recent cases in which similar points were involved, declares that the measure cannot be considered an inspection law, since the citizens are prohibited from importing all liquors whether pure or irnpure; and that it is an unwarrantable obstruction to commerce, as discriminating un- fairly against the products of other States. It was argued in favor of the law, that such legislation was made possible by the " Wilson Bill," so called, enacted by Congress soon after the famous case of Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. This bill was passed for the express purpose of allowing States to legislate upon imported liquors as fully as upon those of domestic manufacture. But the decisive answer to this contention was, that the Dispensary Law did not affect residents and non-resi- dents of the State alike. The "Wilson Bill" was not intended as a protection to partial and discriminating legislation. It allowed absolute prohibition, or such regulations as operated equally upon all. But there must be uniformity. The citizens within the State could not be treated in one way and those outside in another. Upon this broad ground the majority of the court seem principally to base their decision.

Mr. Justice Brown, in his dissenting opinion, while admitting the possible invalidity of some parts of the law as having a discriminating effect, yet holds that this does not apply to the main provisions, which should