Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/466

440 lar election should be fined $2.50. This was a bold attempt to bring out the stay-at-home vote, and would very likely have met with considerable success. Unfortunately, however. a delinquent voter objected to paying the fine, the matter was taken into the courts, and the provision in the city charter was declared uinconstitutional. The opinion of the court has not yet come to hand, but so far as can be learned from the quota- tions that have appeared in newspapers and legal journals, it consists largely of talk about the degradation of the franchise which results from associating it with the nmoniey value of a vote. Unless there is some peculiar provision in the Missouri Constitution, the decision seems wrong. In the ordinary constitution the only clause which -an enactment it like that in question could violate is that which guarantees liberty to every citizen. If the word "liberty'" be given the very broad mean- ing, which courts to-day often ascribe to it, of lil)erty to enjoy all civil rights, possibly it is unconstitutional to compel a man to vote. But that the framers of the Constitution in all probability used the word in its primary and natural sense of mere freedomn from bodily restraint, is clearly the better view. See an article on the subject by Mr. Clharles E. Shattuck, in 4, 365. With that clause of the Constitution out of the way, it is hard to see wlhy the legislature has not the power to make the exercise of the right of suffrage a legal duty. Whether or not such an experiment would lead to satisfactory results is another question.

-Among the extensive changes in the jury system made by the recent Constitution of Utah is the provision that, "In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors." In State v. Bates, 47 Pac. Rep. 78, it was contended that in a crimiinal case it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to have but eight jurors." The court, however, shortly and effectively. disposes of the objection. The anmendment does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but, whatever they are, the power of a State to establish tribunals is not limited by the provision. Nor are twelve jurors necessary to due process of law, which is a requirement of trial according to law, both as to the substance of the crime and the mode of procedure. It does not determine what is crime, nor does it establish any mode of proceduire. It is a shield against the exercise of arbitrary power, but does not prevent changes in the law.

This is an interesting decision, more for the novelty of the question than for any difficulty. In most State constitutions the trial of criLmies by a common-law jury of twelve is secured. The case of Copp v. Henniker,  55 N. H. 179, is instructive on the scope of such provisions. It is well settled that in civil actions trial by jury is not necessary. sary. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. See also Higgins v. Farmers ''Ins. Co''., Co., 60 Iowa, 50, where there was a jury of six. But no real distinction can be drawn in this respect between civil and criminal cases. cases. In Hirtatio v. Caifornia, 110 U. S. 516, the Supreme Court decided that indictment by a grand jury is not necessary. The same principle was involved.

The Constitution of Utah also provides that, "In civil cases, three fourths of the jurors may finid a verdict." An agitation for some such change has recently been started in New York, in order to prevent one or two obstinate jurors from forcing the others to render an unreasonable