Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/393

367 LORD BO WEN'S JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS. 367 It has been charged that Lord Bovven suffered from excess of intellectual light; that his refinements were often too subtle for application in the practical administration of the law. The Master of" the Rolls, for instance, on the occasion to which I have already alluded, plainly intimated as much when he said, " I cannot fail to say that the workings of his mind were so beautifully fine that sometimes what he said escaped me." Without denying that by reason of the compactness of his arguments Lord Bowen's opinions require attentive consideration, the extent of the difficulty expe- rienced by the Master of the Rolls may be observed in Thomas v, Quartermaine,^ where Lord Esher dissented. In the subsequent case of Yarmouth v. France,^ in which the doctrine of Thomas v, Quartermaine was involved, Lord Esher examines at length the opinion of Lord Bowen in the latter case, and is still dissatisfied .with a Hne of reasoning which plainly enlists the admiration of Lord Justice Lindley. Another instance of this alleged refinement, in which the merits of the controversy may be compared, is his review of Lord Justice Fry's theory of the law relating to contracts in restraint of trade, in the Maxim Nordenfelt case.^ See also Miles V. New Zealand Co.,'* where he dissented on the facts. Com- pare his opinion in Vagliano v. Bank of England,^ and in Pandorf V, Hamilton,^ with the opinions given in the House of Lords reversing his judgment. No better proof of the practical bent of his mind can be offered than the fact that he seldom found himself in irreconcilable conflict with his colleagues. In his whole career he did not dissent from the opinion of the majority a dozen times. How much of this result was brought about by consultation is, of course, unknown. But we have the testimony of Lord Justice Fry, that " the pains which he took both to do his own part in the administration of justice to the very best of his great abilities, and so far as he could to secure the best workings of the machinery of the law, were infinite. He never wearied of investigating or discussing a point so long as he thought that anything remained to be got at, or that there was any hope of bringing about an agreement of opinion amongst colleagues who were inclined to differ." On occasion, especially in equity cases, he was ready to yield a reluctant assent to the majority : — 1 18 Q. B. D. 694. 8 [1893] I Ch. 631. 6 23 Q. B. D. 243. 2 19 Q. B. D. 654. / 32 Ch. D. 291. 8 17 Q. B. D. 670.