Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/296

270 270 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. actually owned by the defendant the most liberal hiterpretatlon consistent with reason. His patent claims will be taken at their face value, and no extrinsic circumstances will be considered for the sake of criticising or limiting the scope of the claims thereby. If therefore the article marked by the defendant and the thing purported to be secured by his patent can be fairly judged to be akin to each other, he cannot be found guilty.^ Even if the court upon which devolves the matter of interpret- ing and determining the scope of the defendant's patent ^ is of opinion that the defendant was wrong in believing that the articles marked fell within the operative scope of his patent, this does not fasten upon him the guilty intent. "The fact that the label was untrue does not preclude the defendant from showing that he had adequate reason to believe that it was true, and that he had taken competent and authorita- tive advice upon the subject." ^ Where corporations are involved, the intent of the officer or servant of the corporation does not become the guilty intent of the corporation unless his act in fraudulently marking articles was done in the exercise of properly conferred authority.* The mere fact that an officer of a corporation is doing the cor- poration's business in making or selling goods does not make a fraudulent act in marking them "patented " the act of the corpo- ration. The intent in such a case is special and pecuHar, and the knowledge or intent of an officer does not affect the corporation unless he is acting under some specially conferred authority.^ Although this strict rule is not always enunciated,^ it seems highly probable that an informer, in order to fasten guilty intent upon a corporation,. would be required to prove either a special authority conferred upon an officer or servant, or the equivalent of such authority lying in tacit consent to th£ commission or a repetition of the offence. The courts before which came the earlier cases under this statute were of opinion that in order to constitute an offence the marking must be upon sl patentable as well as an nitpatented article. 1 Lawrence v. Holmes et al., supra. 2 Hawloetz v. Kass, 25 Fed. Rep. 765. 8 Lawrence v. Holmes et al., supra ; Hotchkiss Z'. Cupples Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 1018. ^ Lawrence v. Holmes et al., supra. ^ Hotchkiss v. Cupples Co., supra.
 * Tompkins v. Butterfield, supra.