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261 THE NATURE OF CONSIDERATION. 26 1 was compelled to pay the amount of the debt to the execution creditor. Subsequently the defendant promised the sheriff to repay him the amount so paid, and the sheriff recovered on such promise. What consideration did he give in exchange for it?

If A pays to B a debt he owes him, and afterwards B recovers judgment against A for the same claim, because A neglected to plead payment and produce his receipt, A cannot, without a new promise by B to refund, recover back the sum paid; but with a new promise he can. Bentley v. Morse. But what consideration does A furnish for this new promise?

In Ridout v. Bristow, a widow of a debtor, being also his administratrix, gave the creditor her note for the amount of the debt, expressed to be for "value received by my late husband." The creditor recovered on the note without any proof of any loss, surrender of any right, or waiver of any claim by him, although want of consideration was set up in defence.

What supports a promise by A to pay B for doing exactly what B was already bound to do by a prior contract with C? What new consideration, loss, or detriment to B exists in such cases? Is not the promise binding on A solely from the supposed gain, advantage, or satisfaction ensuing to him from performance of the promise, and without any increased damage, loss, or cost to B than had already been paid for by C?

For instance, if A contracts with B to erect a house, and complete it ready for occupation by a certain day, and C intends to occupy it as a tenant on that day, but, learning that it may not be ready, offers to pay A an additional one hundred dollars if he will surely finish it at the stipulated time, which is done, and C moves in on the very day, is he not liable to A for the promised compensation? Still more obviously, if A had refused to complete the house for B, and was finally induced to do so only by the additional promise of C.

Shadwell v. Shadwell, in the Common Pleas, is the earliest case on this point, in which the uncle of the plaintiff promised to pay him one hundred and fifty pounds sterling a year upon his intended marriage with a certain lady to whom he was already engaged. Subsequently the marriage took place according to the original agreement, and the defendant paid the annuity for several