Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/277

251 RECENT CASES. 25 1 was engaged in this business subjected to payment of her husband's debts Held, a husband in rendering to his wife in her business more help than he would ordinarily give her as head of the family, makes such business his own as regards his creditors. Talcottv. Arnold, 35 Atl. Rep. 532 (N. J.). If actual fraud was found in the present case, such as to make the wife's business in reality that of the husband, the result reached is undoubtedly correct. On the other hand, it seems to be a sound rule of law, that, as the earning power and labor of an insolvent are not assets to his creditors, he may, if he does so bona fide, work in his wife's employ without subjecting her business to his creditor's claims. Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 344; Mayers v. Kaiser^ 85 Wis. 382. Though some of the court's language seems opposed to this last proposition, the case, on its facts, seems to have been rightly decided. The husband here did something more than work for his wife. By his labor he obtained certain property, namely, the patents. By the transfer of that property to his wife for the benefit of her business, he gave his creditors the right to subject such property of the wife's as was the result of the patents to the payment of their claims. Property — Adverse Possession. — The defendant had had possession of land for ten years, but other parties had entered and cut hay, their entries not being suffi- cient to break the continuity of the defendant's possession. Held, that the possession must be adverse to the whole world, not merely to the plaintiff who sues for the land. Bracken v. Union Pacific R. R. Co,, 75 Fed. Rep. 317. The language of the court is ambiguous, and it is difficult to discover its meaning. As no question of successive disseisin is raised, the most plausible interpretation is that, in order to bar the true owner's right, the defendant must not have allowed parties to enter on the land during his occupancy. But if defendant's possession was continu- ous, and the jury did not find that the entries of the third parties were interruptions of it, then such entries were trespasses for which the defendant, being in possession, might have recovered damages. They did not amount to new disseisins. The facts of the case show that the plaintiff was out of possession for more than ten years (the statutory period in Nebraska), and that the defendant had continuous open adverse possession for that time. That the court should require his possession to have been also exclu- sive appears to be erroneous. Property — Quitclaim Deed — Purchaser for Value. — ZT^/^, that the holder of a quitclaim deed, properly recorded, who purchased in good faith and without notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance, takes title in preference to the grantee under such unrecorded conveyance. Scholty. Dosh, 68 N. V. Rep. 346 (Neb.). This case is interesting as showing what appears to be a tendency to drift away from earlier cases which hold that a quitclaim deed conclusively charges the grantee with notice of outstanding equities, including prior unrecorded conveyances. Steele v. Sioux Valley Bank, 79 Iowa, 339. The cases are hopelessly in conflict on this point, but the principal case represents the better view. It is to be noted that most of the authority contra to the principal case is very largely based on dicta in the United States Supreme Court cases, notably May v. Le Clare, i Wall. 217, which have been discredited by the more recent case of Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21. Sales — Bona Fide Mortgagee of Purchaser. — A purchased a chattel, giv- ing in payment his note, indorsed by B as surety. It was agreed that property in the chattel should be in B until A paid the note. A, being in possession, purchased goods of C and agreed to give C a mortgage on the chattel in question as security. After delivery of the goods, but before the execution of the mortgage, C learned of the agreement between A and B. Held, that C could foreclose, and that his claim to the proceeds of sale should be prior to B's, though B had been compelled to pay the note given by A. Wood v. Evans, 25 S. E. Rep. 559 (Ga.). If A had the legal title which the court seems to assume, the result reached is question- able. By the great weight of authority, C, having notice before the execution of the mortgage, should not have been regarded as a bona fide mortgagee. The view contra to the principal case was applied to a sale by a trustee as early as 1692. Saunders v. Dehen, 2 Vern. 271. So, a purchaser who receives notice of an equity before the indorsement of a bill is made to him, but after delivery and payment, is not a bona fide purchaser. Lancaster Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 18 ; Goshen Bank v. Bingham^ 118 N. Y. 349. The principal case, however, does not stand alone" in this point. Youst V. Martin, 3 S. & R. 423. If, however, B acquired the legal title, C's priority may have been properly upheld by the court, on their construction of a Georgia statute, requiring B to record his claim. Taxation — Situs of Intangible Property. — In three cases arising under an inheritance tax law, the New York Court of Appeals held, that the legislature has