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193 RECENT CASES. 193 grantee, absence of consideration, if shown merely by parol evidence, is not sufficient under the Statute of Frauds to raise a resulting trust in favor of the grantor, where there has been no fraud in procuring the deed. Lovett v. Taylor, 34 Atl. Rep. 896 (N. J.). The decision follows the great weight of authority in this country, i Perry on Trusts, 4th ed., § 162, and also the earlier cases in England ; Lloyd. Spillet, 2 Atk. 148 ; but the more recent English cases are almost directly in opposition. Daviesv. OUy, 35 Beav. 208 ; Childersw. Childers, i DeG. & J. 482 ; Hai^^/i v. Kaye,j Ch. App. 469. The ground on which these decisions rest is that, although the Statute of Frauds makes of no value parol evidence of lack of consideration for the purpose of raising a resulting trust in such a case, yet the mere subsequent holding by the grantee after demand is a fraud of such a nature as to take the case out of the statute. The answer given to this line of reasoning in Randall v. Randall, 9 Wis. 379, is that the fraud alleged does not occur in procuring the deed, and therefore is not one that the statute takes cogni- zance of in limiting its own application. Trusts — Separate Use — Restraint against Anticipation. — By the Married Women's Act of 1882, all the separate property of a married woman — after acquired as well as that owned at the time the engagement was entered into — was made liable for he' obligations. Sec. I. sub-sec. 19, however, provided that nothing in the act should •' interfere with or render inoperative any restriction against anticipation." The appel- lant's assignor obtained a judgment against respondent, a married woman. At the time the judgment was rendered there was due to respondent accrued income from property settled to her separate use without power of anticipation. Held, reversing Loftus v. Heriot, [1875] 2 Q. B. 212, that the restraint on anticipation is gone the moment the income becomes due and payable ; that appellant therefore was entitled to have his judgment paid out of income due before the date of the judgment. Hood Barrs v. Hcriot, [1896] A. C. 174 (House of Lords). While the decision in the principal case is carefully limited to the case of income accrued before judgment, the 7'atio decidendi deals a death blow to the authority of those cases in which it has been held that income accrued after judgment on property subject to a restraint is not subject to seizure. Hood Barrs v. Cathcart, [1894] 2 Q. B. 559. This decision, recognizing much broader rights in a creditor as against a married woman's estate than he has hitherto been supposed to possess, is of great practical im- portance in England. The decision in the principal case has a suggestive bearing in connection with the doctrine of spendthrift trusts. Granting the validity of such trusts, has not the bene- ficiary complete power of disposition over accrued income of the trust which the trustee is bound to pay him } If he has full power of disposition over such accrued income, is it not liable to seizure by his creditors .'• On the facts of Steib v. Whitehead, in 111. 247, and Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, apparently such accrued income is not liable to seizure. In neither of these cases, however, was the point here suggested argued ; in both cases the opinion deals solely with the question of the validity of a spendthrift thrust. Wills — Construction. — Testator, having a lawful wife, whom he had deserted, married again and lived with the second wife until he died. By his will he bequeathed certain property to his "wife." Held, that, on the evidence, the second wife was in- tended and should take. Tastene v. Bonini, 44 N. E. Rep. 246 (Mass.). The decision shows the court's opinion to be that it is competent to show, by evidence, that an inaccurately described legatee is intended, though the description may accurately apply to another. The case resembles, in this respect, Grant v. Grant, L. R. 5 C. P. 727. It is probable that in Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Mete. 188, the evidence was not sufficiently strong in favor of the party inaccurately described, and that that case is really not contra to the present decision. The principal case is interesting, also, as showing the refusal of the court to recognize any rule of law which declares that wife shall mean " lawful wife," or any presumption to that effect. Hardy v. Smith, 136 Mass. 328, followed. The analogous presumption raised by the law, namely, that '* children " means legitimate children [Doe d. Thomas, Bey non, 2 A. & E, 431) was not overlooked by the court, but rather disregarded.