Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/204

178 1/8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. done. It is to be noticed that in the principal case stress is laid on the Illinois statute, making a married woman equally liable with her husband for necessaries furnished to the family, provided she has a separate estate. This undoubtedly made it easier for the court to render the decision they did, but it is only one of the many statutes the spirit of which must be regarded. There may readily be a difference of opinion as to whether the spirit of the laws so far enacted does justify the decision in the principal case. It may well be said that up to the present time statutes have merely sought to protect the wife from the power of her lord and master. However, so much has been justly said against the fairness of modern legislation, as removing woman's disabilities without imposing upon her the correspond- ing burdens, that it is rather refreshing to see this very legislation instru- mental in imposing the " burdens " with a vengeance. " Gold Clause " Contracts. — The demand in the platform of one of our political parties that Congress enact legislation to prevent the de- monetization of any kind of legal tender money by private contract, has occasioned some discussion as to the legal efficacy of " gold clause " con- tracts. Are contracts for money payable specifically in gold coin of the United States enforceable? Can Congress by retrospective legislation make nugatory such contracts already in existence ? As the law now stands, the answer to the first question is in no doubt. In Bronson v. Rhodes, 7 Wall. 229 (1868), the United States Supreme Court declared that a bond payable in gold and silver coin of the United States could not be satisfied by a tender of United States legal tender currency of the same nominal amount as the face of the bond. The Legal Tender Cases ^ 12 Wall. 457 (1870), estabhshed the validity of such a tender to discharge an antecedent debt payable in money generally, on the ground that such a contract contemplated payment in what was lawful money at the time of payment and not at the time of contracting. The court care- fully guarded itself against overruling Bronson v. Rhodes (see 12 Wall, at p. 548), and a year later reaffirmed this latter decision in Trebilcock v. Wil- son, 12 Wall. 687 (187 1), where it explicitly declared the Legal Tender Act not applicable to contracts payable in other specific forms of money. A recent United States decision, Woodruff. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 291, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820, has been occasionally cited to the contrary during the past summer by careless writers. The court here, however, decided that the true construction of the contract made it payable, not in gold coin, but in money generally, so the point in question did not arise. 162 U. S. at p. 302, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. at p. 824. At present, therefore, there can be no difficulty in enforcing " gold clause " obligations. Nor is it probable that any act of Congress designed to destroy the effect of gold contracts already made would be held constitutional. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the United States from de- priving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Retrospective legislation that impairs vested rights is a deprivation of property without due process of law within this prohibition. Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th ed., 431, 443 ; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202 ; Streubelw. Ry., 12 Wis. 67; Taylor w. Porter, d^ Hill, 140, 145. What is meant by due process of law? '-Undoubtedly a pre-existent rule of conduct, de- clarative of a penalty for a prohibited act ; not an ex post facto rescript