Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/199

173 DICKY'S ''CONFLICT OF LAWSP 1 73 House of Lords decided, as it must, that the effect of the clause was to be determined by the law of England, where it was agreed that the arbitration should take place. Lord Watson called it a question of interpretation, to be determined according to the inten- tion of the parties ; ^ Lord Herschell treated it as a question of the right created.^ The case is therefore no authority on the point under discussion. A second view is that taken by the Supreme Court of the United States, first suggested in usury cases, — that though the contract would be void for usury where made, it would yet be supported if valid where it was to be performed. The choice of law was, how- ever, limited, the contract must be valid either by the lex loci contractus or by the law of the bona fide place of performance.^ In usury cases this rule was not without considerations to support it, since the usury act of the place of contracting might be said not to forbid payment of a high rate of interest in another State. The rule was, however, extended to cover all cases where the suffi- ciency of consideration was in question,* and is commonly stated to be that the lex loci solutionis determines the sufficiency of the consideration, unless the parties evidently intended the lex loci con- tractus to govern. This rule has been very widely followed in the State courts. A third view, and the true one, is however held in some juris- dictions of the highest authority; namely, that all questions of consideration are to be determined exclusively by the lex loci con- tractus^ In view of this conflict among the authorities, it seems not improper to insist upon the rule which is unquestionably in accordance with principle. It remains to consider the authorities upon the interpretation of contracts, the nature of the rights acquired, and matter pertaining to performance, discharge, and breach. On these points there appears to be agreement among all the authorities, the rules sug- gested above as founded on principle being followed. Thus the interpretation of a contract depends (as to the law governing it, that is, as to the legal meaning of the language) on the intention of the parties; ^ questions as to the legal effect of acts done under 1 Page 212, 8 Junction R. R. v. Ashland Bank, 12 Wall. 226. 2 Page 207. 4 Pritchard v. Norton, ro6 U. S. 124. ^ Akersz/.Demond, 103 Mass. 318; Staples ^'. Nott, 128 N. Y.403, 28N. E. Rep. 515. V. Brazilian S. T. Co., [1891] i Q. B. 79.
 * Lord Watson, in Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery. [1894] A. C. 202, 212 ; Chatenay