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128 128 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the State for the benefit of all its people in common ; and that it is not a violation of the Interstate Commerce clause of the Con- stitution for a State to prohibit the transportation, outside its limits, of game lawfully killed in the State. Field, J., and Harlan, J., dissenting. Geer v. State, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600. The opinion of the majority is based on the reasoning that, when a State gives one the right to kill game, which it undoubtedly may do, it has the power if it pleases to confer only a qualified ownership in the game, quite different from the perfect nature of ownership in other property. The decision is contra to State v. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127, and Territory. Evans, 23 Pac. Rep. 115 (Idaho); but owing to the peculiar na- ture of property in animals feres natures, which was overlooked in the two cases snpra, it seems the more reasonable interpretation of the Constitution. Constitutional Law — Self-Incriminating Testimony. — A federal statute provides that no person shall be excused from testifying before the Interstate Commerce Commission on the ground that his testimony may tend to criminate him ; but that no person shall be prosecuted for any transaction concerning which he may testify. Held, four judges dissenting, that this is not in conflict with the fifth amendment to the Con- stitution, which provides that no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. Brown v. Walker, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644. See Notes. Constitutional Law — Turnpike Road — Regulation of Rates. — The char- ter of a turnpike road company provided that it should be lawful for the company to take certain fixed tolls. There was no reserved power to alter the charter. Later the legislature passed an act fixing uniform rates for all turnpikes in the State, which were less than those fixed in the company's charter. Held, latter act valid. Though the charter of a private corporation is a contract, and is within the protection of the clause against impairing the obligations of contracts, yet if the corporation has a public func- tion to perform it is not protected from legislative interference unless the State has clearly indicated in the charter a purpose not to interfere. Winchester <Sr» L. lurnpike Road Co. V. Croxton, 34 S. W. Rep. 518 (Ky.). The case is very similar to, but goes a step beyond. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, where a grant of a power to fix charges was held not to prevent the legis- lature from establishing rates ; power was granted only to fix reasonable charges, and the legislature is the judge of reasonableness; the legislature did not intend to surren- der its power to fix rates. So, in the principal case, it is a question of the construction of the contract, whether the State meant, by granting the right to charge certain fixed rates, to barter away forever the power to provide reasonable rates. The court's treat- ment of the case is sound, and the case is a good illustration of the rule that rights not expressly granted by the State are reserved. Constitutional Law — Vested Rights under a Charter. — Bill by a stock- holder in the Great Northern Railway, to restrain the company from carrying out a contract of consolidation with the Northern Pacific Railway, whereby one half of the capital stock of the latter was to be transferred to stockholders of the Great Northern, and the Great Northern was to guarantee the payment of certain Northern Pacific bonds. The two lines were parallel and competing. The charter given to the Great Northern in 1856 reserved the right of amendment "in any manner not destroying or impairing the vested rights of said corporation." By an amendment in 1865, the rail- road was given general power to consolidate with other roads. In 1874 the legislature forbade consolidation with parallel or competing lines; and subsequently to this act of 1874 the contract in question was entered into. Held, that so long as the power to con- solidate remained unexecuted, it was not a vested right beyond the scope of legislative control, and thus the act of 1874 did not impair the obligation of a contract. Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 16 Sup, Ct. Rep. 705, The case involves a point not covered by previous authorities. The doctrine of the court appears to be that a power in a charter to do certain things which are unneces- sary to the main object of the grant, may be treated as a mere license, and revoked by the legislature so long as the power remains unexecuted. The case itself calls for nothing more than a decision that such an unexecuted power does not constitute a vested right within the meaning of the amendment clause in the original charter; how- ever, the very next case in the reporter contains a dictum to the effect that, even where the charter contains no clause of reservation, the public nature of railway corporations is such as to subject them to this sort of legislative control. Under its police power, said the court in Louisville (Sr» N. Ry. Co. v. Kentuckv, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep, 715, the legisla- ture " may deal with the charter of a railway corporation so far as is necessary for the protection of the lives, health, and safety of its passengers or the public, or for the security of property, or the conservation of the public interests, provided, of course,