Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 1.djvu/67

 law refuse to recognize; but it does not follow that the right thus recognized is properly an equitable right. So courts of equity may treat an act as a violation of a legal right, which courts of common law treat as rightful; but it does not follow that such an act is properly an equitable tort. A well-known instance of such an act is found in what is commonly called equitable waste. For example, if a tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, cut down ornamental trees, or pull down houses, a court of equity says he has committed waste, while a court of common law says he has not. Either court may be wrong, and one of them must be; for the question depends entirely upon the legal effect to be given to the words “without impeachment of waste,” and that cannot depend upon the kind of court in which the question happens to arise. Yet the practical consequence of this diversity of view is, that there is a remedy in equity against the tenant in the case supposed, while there is none at law; and this gives to the act of the tenant the semblance of being an equitable tort. In truth, however, the act is a legal tort, if the view taken by courts of equity is correct, while it is a rightful act, if the view taken by courts of common law is correct.

There are, however, true equitable rights, and also true equitable wrongs, the latter being violations of equitable rights. A true equitable right is always derivative and dependent, i.e., it is derived from, and dependent upon, a legal right. A true equitable right exists when a legal right is held by its owner for the benefit of another person, either wholly or in part. Such a right may be defined as an equitable personal obligation. It is an obligation because it is not ownership; and because it is relative, i.e., it cannot exist without a correlative duty; and it is personal because the duty is imposed upon the person of the owner of the res (i.e., of the legal right), and not upon the res itself. And yet courts of equity frequently act as if such rights were real obligations, and even as if they were ownership. Indeed, it may be said that they always so act when they can thereby render the equitable right more secure and valuable, and yet act consistently with the fact