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  the mortgage. The vendee objected to the title, but it was held that the settlement was voluntary, and the mortgage prevailed over it. In re Cameron and Wells, 45 W. N. 185.

Price v. Jenkins, 4 Ch. D. 483, was cited by counsel. It is directly in point, but was reversed in 5 Ch. D. 619, on another ground, and this question was left open. Clarke v. Wright, 6 H. & N. 849, which upheld a settlement on an illegitimate son of the woman, seems not to have been cited, but it was characterized in Price v. Jenkins as a case to be followed only when the circumstances are exactly similar.

——Land was devised in fee on condition that the legatee “take the name and bear the arms of Say.” There was no gift over. The legatee entered into an agreement for the sale of the land. The purchaser objected to the title on the ground that the land would go to the testator’s heir if the legatee ceased to “bear” the arms. Held—That the legatee, having taken the name and borne the arms, had fulfilled the condition, and could give a good title. Re Farrar and Champion, 84 L. T. 25.

——A devise to A for life, remainder over to B, was void as to A by reason of her having witnessed the will. Held—That B was not advanced, but the life estate went to the heirs. Elliot v. Brent, 15 Wash. L. Rep. 754 (Sup. Court, D. C.). See contra, Jull v. Jacobs, 3 Ch. D. 703.

By Hampton L. Carson, of the Philadelphia bar; Text-book series, Vol. 1, No. 1. The Blackstone Publishing Company, Philadelphia, 1887, pp. 235.

This work is bound in the same volume with “Wright on Criminal Conspiracy,” and, unlike the others of the same series, is not a reprint. Mr. Carson’s work was originally intended, as he says, to illustrate Mr. Wright’s text “by reference to the American cases in the form of notes;” but he found so much material that he concluded to shape it into a distinct hand-book for the lawyer in active practice.

In view of the recent wide-spread labor disturbances, Mr. Carson’s section entitled, “Conspiracies Relating to the Rates of Wages—Strikes and Boycotts,” pages 144 to 179, will not be found the least interesting in the book. His conclusions from the cases cited, many of which are very recent, including The Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, and State v. Glidden, is briefly as follows: Workmen may lawfully combine for many purposes, such as the raising of their wages, the prevention of overcrowding in their trade, etc. “The moment, however, that they proceed by threats, intimidation, violence, obstruction, or molestation, in order to secure their ends; or where their object be to impoverish third persons, or to extort money from their employers, or to ruin their business, or to encourage strikes or breaches of contract among others, or to restrict the freedom of others for the purpose of compelling employers to conform to their views, or to attempt to enforce rules upon those not members of their association, they render themselves liable to indictment.”

On the whole, Mr. Carson’s book seems to live up to the preface in a satisfactory manner. Its merit is rather as a hand-book of the latest decisions in criminal conspiracy, than as a very learned or scientific treatise on the subject.

B. G. D.