Page:Harris v. State (2018 Ark. 179).pdf/16

 he or she was eighteen years of age, including minors serving sentences of life, regardless of the original sentences that were imposed.

The parole-eligibility provisions of the FSMA are clearly and expressly meant to apply retroactively. The majority concludes that "the parole eligibility provision did not apply to Harris at the time of his May 8, 2017 hearing" because after his original sentence was vacated, "Harris was no longer serving a sentence to which parole-eligibility could attach." The parole-eligibility provision applies to any sentence for a crime involving a death that was committed by a juvenile before, on, or after the effective date of the FSMA, and the FSMA clearly states that the provision is to be applied retroactively regardless of the original sentence imposed. The trial court resentenced Harris to life imprisonment, and regardless of when that sentence was imposed, the parole-eligibility provision applies to that sentence because the offense was committed before Harris was eighteen years of age. The fact that he was not serving a sentence of life imprisonment on the date of his resentencing hearing makes no difference whatsoever, and the majority's holding flies squarely in the face of the express language used by the legislature in the FSMA.

In 1996, Harris was sentenced to life imprisonment. Under the applicable statute in effect at that time, he was not eligible for parole. Under the FSMA, the portion of the statute stating that he is not eligible for parole has been expressly, retroactively overridden to provide that he is eligible for parole after thirty years. The sentence of life imprisonment remains unchanged. As the only change involved parole eligibility, and that change expressly applies regardless of the timing of the offense or the sentence imposed