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 stating that only when the General Assembly expressly provides that an act should be applied retroactively will we do so).

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the legislature expressly stated its intent that other sections of the FSMA apply retroactively, regardless of the date of the commission of the criminal offense. See FSMA §§ 9–13 (amending title 16, chapter 93 to provide parole eligibility to a person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense "before, on, or after the effective date of this act"). We have recognized that the express designation of one thing may be properly construed to mean the exclusion of another. E.g., Larry Hobbs Farm Equip., Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 291 S.W.3d 190 (2009). Therefore, when the legislature includes retroactivity language in some sections of an act but omits it in other sections of the same act, we may presume that the legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); Bolin v. State, 2015 Ark. 149, at 5–6, 459 S.W.3d 788, 791–92 (stating that when there was no "general expression of intent that the whole act should apply retroactively," but a "specific expression of intent" that part of the act applies retroactively, the court could conclude that the only retroactive part of the law was that expressly designated in the act). Had the legislature intended for the penalty provisions in sections 3 and 6 to be retroactive, it could have included language to that effect as it did for the parole-eligibility provisions in sections 9–13. See Bolin, 2015 Ark. 149, 459 S.W.3d 788.

Finally, although the FSMA contains an emergency clause and therefore became effective on March 20, 2017, we find no language in the clause that expressly states or