Page:Harris v. State (2018 Ark. 179).pdf/12

 with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum of thirty years’ imprisonment. FSMA § 6.

Since the enactment of the criminal code, this court has consistently held that sentencing shall be in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See, e.g., Cody v. State, 326 Ark. 85, 929 S.W.2d 159 (1996). In addition, this court has observed a strict rule of construction against retroactive operation, and we indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only and not retroactively. E.g., Bean v. Office of Child Support Enf't, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000). The rule of prospectivity applies unless "the intention of the legislature to make the statute retroactive is stated in express terms, or is clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally, unmistakably, and unambiguously shown by necessary implication or by terms which permit no other meaning to be annexed to them, and which preclude all question in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt thereof." ''Estate of Wood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.'', 319 Ark. 697, 700–01, 894 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1995). Further, we have held that in the absence of an express statement that a sentencing statute will apply retroactively, the statute will apply prospectively only. See State v. Murphy, 315 Ark. 68, 864 S.W.2d 842 (1993).

Here, we find no general retroactivity provision in the FSMA, nor is there one attached to the penalty provisions of the Act. Therefore, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for the penalty provisions to apply retroactively. See State v. Ross, 344 Ark. 364, 39 S.W.3d 789 (2001) (noting that sentencing is controlled entirely by statute and