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Rh dependence, which the United States had already acknowledged, were shared by his government, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the President. Monroe, on receiving the correspondence, hastened to take counsel upon it. Jefferson, whose opinion was solicited, replied: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." He was disposed to look with favor upon co-operation with England in the direction suggested, and Madison shared his opinion. In the cabinet of Monroe, Calhoun inclined to invest Rush with power to join England in a declaration, even if it should pledge the United States not to take either Cuba or Texas. The President at first was inclined to Calhoun's idea of giving Rush discretionary powers, but this was opposed by John Quincy Adams, who maintained that we could act with England only on the basis of the acknowledged independence of the Spanish-American states. The views of Adams prevailed. His basal thought was the right of self-government, which he believed it to be the duty and the interest of the United States to cherish and support. He thought that the United States should let England make her own declaration. This England did, without waiting for the decision of the United States. On October 9, 1823, Canning, in an interview with Prince de Polignac, French ambassador, declared that while Great Britain would remain "neutral" in any war between Spain and her colonies, the "junction" of any foreign power with Spain against the colonies would be viewed as constituting "entirely a new question," upon which Great Britain "must take such decision" as her interests "might require."

In his annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823, President Monroe de-