Page:Halsbury Laws of England v1 1907.pdf/596

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Animals.

374 Sect.

1.

Injuries

by

Animals.

evidence that such complaints were ever communicated to the owner. But the mere fact that some servant in the defendant's employment has knowledge is not sufficient. It must be a servant who has actual management or control over the premises or business or the

animal

Who

is

liable

as owner.

Negligence.

{e)

.

not essential that the defendant should be the real owner of the animal. Anyone who keeps it on his premises or allows it to resort there may be liable (/), though if the animal has strayed there, and he has done nothing to encourage it or exercise control over it, he will not then be responsible (g). It is

816. The Owner of a domestic and harmless animal may, howon the ground of negligence. Thus, where two dogs leashed together rushed against a passer-by and threw him down and broke his leg, the owner was held liable on the ground of negligence in having two big dogs coupled together on the highway at night and not keeping them in hand (h). ever, be liable

Sub-Sect. Liability

apart from scienter or

negligence.

2.

Injuries hy Wild

and Dangerous Animals.

817. With regard to animals of a naturally savage and irreclaimable character, such as lions or tigers, though there is nothing unlawful in keeping them, a man does so at his peril, and is liable for any injury committed by them, irrespective of negligence or knowledge {i). This is part of the broad principle of law that a person who brings on to his land, or keeps, a dangerous thing is liable, independently of negligence, if it escape and cause damage (Zc). Therefore, if an animal is of a kind generally known to be dangerous or mischievous, the owner is liable for any damage caused by it, whether he have knowledge of its particular propensities or not (Z). It is difficult to enunciate an exact formula for the classification of dangerous animals. Whether they are ferce naturce so far as Keating,

J. (Brett, J., dissenting). Lord Coleridge suggested that it is a question for the jury in each case whether the persons to whom notice was given stood in such a relation to the defendant as to make it their duty to communicate it to him. (e) Stiles V. Cardiff Steam Navigation Co. (1864), 33 L. J. (q. b.) 310._ The Court in this case said that there was no difference between a corporation and an individual in this respect (see also Applebee v. Ferci/ (1874), L. E. 9 C. P. 647). The effect of this decision as far as (/) M'Kone v. Wood (1831), 5 C. & P. 1. dogs are concerned was incorporated into the Dogs Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Yict. c. 60), s. 2, which is now repealed and re-enacted with a slight alteration in the Dogs Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7', c. 32), s. 1. See note (n), p. 397, post. {g) Smith Y. Great Eastern Bail. Go. (1866), L. E. 2 C. P. 4. (A) Jones y. Owen (1871), 24 L. T. 587. As to liability of the owner of such an animal to a tresj)asser, see p. 375, p)Ost. (i) The duty of a person who owns a wild animal, as laid down in May v. Burdett (1846), 9 Q. B. 101, is to keep it secui^e at his peril. If he does keep the animal secure, e.g., tied up in a stable, he is not liable to a man who goes into the stable to stroke the animal and gets injured by it, see Marlor v. Ball (1900), 16 T. L. E. 239 (zebras). {h) Fletcher Y. Bylands (1866), L. E. 1 Exch. 265, and on appeal (1868), L. E. 3 H. L. 330 see per BowEisr, L. J., in Filhurn v. Beople's Balace and Aquarium Go. (1890), 25 Q. B. D. at p. 261. (l) 1 Hale, P. 0. 430.