Page:Halsbury Laws of England v1 1907.pdf/267

 — Part YII.

—Forms

of Action.

damages from a defendant who had converted (r) the plaintiff's a finding of the goods by the defendant was to his own use alleged, and he was not permitted to dispute the allegation. The circumstances in which actions of trover and trespass to goods

goods



45 Sect.

1.

Old Forms of Action.

lay were very similar, but trover w^as founded on the property in in trover damages the goods, trespass on the possession of them (s)

only could be recovered (t). In order to maintain trover the plaintiff had to prove either an absolute or a special property in the goods in question {a), and also a right to the possession of them thus a man who let a furnished house could not maintain trover during the term, if the furniture was wrongfully taken away (b). As an instance of special property, the finder of an article was held to have such a property in it as would enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner, and to maintain trover in respect of its conversion (c).

75. The actions of error (d) and false judgment (<?) were the Appeal by actions of ancient methods of prosecuting appeals from judgments of superior error and and inferior Courts respectively. The proceedings on a writ of false error (which was an original writ) were analogous to those on an judgment. action, and the person appealing against the judgment was called the plaintiff' in error. A writ of error was considered to be the commencement of a new action (/). Sect.

2.

Abolition of Old

Forms

q/ Action.

76. The principle of conducting litigation in accordance with Royal Comrules of procedure, which varied with the different forms of action ^^^g founded on particular original waits, formed the basis of English

common law

for seven centuries. In 1828, however, a Koyal Comwas appointed to inquire into the " course of proceeding actions and other civil proceeding established or used in the

mission in

(g)

superior Courts of The first result

common

law."

of the inquiries of this

Commission was the

Uniformity of Process Act, 1832 {h). This statute abolished the original writ in personal actions, and all the other substituted

methods of commencing actions, and substituted therefor, in cases where it was not intended to hold the defendant to special bail, a " Conversion by a long course of practice lias acquired a technical meanIt means detaining goods so as to deprive the person entitled to the .possession of them of his dominion over them" {Burroughes v. Bay ne {I860), 0 H. & N. 296, per Maetin, B., at p. 302. See also Tinkler v. Poole (1770), 5 Burr. 2657; Boss v. Johnson (1112), 5 Butt. 2825; Owen v. Lewyn (1613), 1 Yent. 223; Youl y HarhoUle (1791), Peake, N. P. 68; ShijpwicJc y. Blanchard (1795), 6 Term Eep. 298). (s) Ward v. Macauley (1791), 4 Term Eep. 489. [t) Bishop V. Montague [Viscountess) (1601), Cro. Eliz. 824. a) Well V. Fox (1797), 7 Term Eep. 391, 398. (?')

ing.

.

Harper (1796), 7 Term Eep. 9. v. Delamirie(1122), 1 Smith, L. 0. (11th ed.), p. 356. {d) Fitz. Nat. Brev. 20. (e) Ibid., 18 ; Co. Litt. 60 a, 288 b.

[h)

Gordon

(c)

Armory

v.

(/) Batchelor

v. Ellis (1191), 1

Term Eep. 337 but

4B. &C. 116. (.7) The Commissioners presented three {h) 2 Will. 4, c. 39.



reports.

see Laidler v. Foster (1825),

Uniformity

fJ^ggl' '