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 Action.

16

Sect. 3.

Damnum absque injuria.

whose breach of duty the danger arises to say that the injured person had a knowledge of the danger and risked it (k).

Remoteness of damage.

19. Lastly, there are numerous cases in which one man sustains a damage in consequence of the act of another, but is unable to maintain an action because the damage is too "remote," i.e., is not the legal and natural consequences of the act complained of (l).

Sect. 4.— De minimis non curat lex.

Maxim does not apply where consequential damage might ensue, or character is involved.

20. As above stated, where a person's right is infringed he can maintain an action, although he has suffered no appreciable damage. It is reasonable that he should be able to do so where the act in question, if unchallenged, might enable adverse claims to be substantiated against his property, or where his character is involved (m).

Where maxim applies.

Where, however, a plaintiff has no good reason for wishing to vindicate his right, it is not the policy of the Courts to encourage the bringing of actions unless actual appreciable damage has been suffered; and in such cases they may apply the maxim De minimis non curat lex (n). Thus the plaintiff's injury may be of so small and little consideration in the law that no action will lie for it (o).

A trifling departure from the terms of a contract will not necessarily preclude a Court from holding that it has been substantially performed (p). So too in construing revenue statutes it has been said that the Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the application of statutes; if the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing in the public interest, it might properly be overlooked (q). Similarly the law takes no notice of gradual accretion to land not appreciable except after the lapse of considerable time (r); and where power was conferred by statute to fix boundaries it was said that the Court would not interfere if the errors complained of were only trivial (s). It has been suggested too that in considering whether a councillor is disqualified by reason of his interest in a contract with his council, the maxim might apply to trifling purchases over the counter, e.g., of " a paint-brush or a few nails " (a). Again, where a testator leaves to a legatee such articles of plate as he may choose, the legatee, being entitled (in strictness) to choose all but a valueless trifle, may take the whole (h).


 * (k) Thomas v. Quartermaine (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 685, 697.
 * (l) See title Damages.
 * (m) See Joyce v. Metropolitan Board of Works (1881), 44 L. T. 811.
 * (n) See, e.g., Taverner v. Cromwell (1591), Cro. Eliz. 353; Smith v. Targett (1795), 2 Anstr. 533; Brace v. Taylor (1741), 2 Atk. 253.
 * (o) Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 938, per Powys, J., at p. 944.
 * (p) Whitcher v. Hall (1826), 5 B. & C. 269, per Littledale, J., at p. 277.
 * (q) The Reward (1818), 2 Dods. 265, per Sir W. Scott. See also French Guiana (1817), 2 Dods. 151 (a prize case).
 * (r) New River Co. v. Land Tax Commissioners (1857), 2 H. & N. 129, 138; see also Ford v. Lacy (1861), 7 H. & N. 151, 155.
 * (s) Graham v. Berry (1865), 3 Moo. P. C. C. (N. S.) 207, 223.
 * (a) Nutton v. Wilson (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 744, per Lopes, L.J., at p. 749; but see R. v. Rowlands, [1906] 2 K. B. 292.
 * (b) Arthur v. Mackinnon (1879), 11 Ch. D. 385.