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36 the Tribes “derive from the Constitution, not the atmosphere.” It engages in a robust history-driven analysis of the various fonts of congressional authority without relying only on platitudes about plenary power. Ante, at 11–13. It notes that, as an original matter, the Indian Commerce Clause is “broad” and covers more than garden-variety commercial activity. Ante, at 11–16. In the process, it reaffirms that “ ‘commerce with the Indian [T]ribes’ ” necessarily covers commerce with “Indians as individuals.”

No less importantly, the Court acknowledges what the federal government cannot do. “Article I gives Congress a series of enumerated powers, not a series of blank checks.” And that means that “Congress’s authority to legislate with respect to Indians is not unbounded,” but instead comes with concrete limitations. Ibid. To resolve the present dispute, the Court understandably sees no need to demarcate those limitations further. But I hope that, in time, it will follow the implications of today’s decision where they lead and return us to the original bargain struck in the Constitution—and, with it, the respect for Indian sovereignty it entails.

With all the historical pieces of this puzzle assembled, only one task remains. You must decide for yourself if ICWA passes constitutional muster.

By now, the full picture has come into view and it is easy to see why ICWA must stand. Under our Constitution, Tribes remain independent sovereigns responsible for governing their own affairs. And as this Court has long recognized, domestic law arrangements fall within Tribes’ traditional powers of self-governance. See, e.g., Fisher, 424 U. S., at 387; Quiver, 241 U. S., at 605. As “ ‘a separate people’ ” Tribes may “ ‘regulat[e] their internal and social relations’ ” as they wish. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 322 (quoting