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Rh creating federal restrictions concerning what United States citizens and States may do in the context of Indian [T]ribes.” Ibid. Nothing in the Clause grants Congress the affirmative power to reassign to the federal government inherent sovereign authorities that belong to the Tribes.

In that way, the Indian Commerce Clause confirms, rather than abridges, principles of tribal sovereignty. As it must. It is “inconceivable” that a power to regulate non-Indians’ dealings with Indians could be used to “dives[t Tribes] of the right of self-government.” Worcester, 6 Pet., at 554. Otherwise, a power to manage relations with a party would become an instrument for “annihilating the political existence of one of the parties.” Ibid. No one in the Nation’s formative years thought that could be the law. They understood that Congress could no more use its commerce powers to legislate away a Tribe than it could a State or a foreign sovereign. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 855 (1976); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523–526 (1926); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76–77 (1869). The framers appreciated, too, that they possessed no more “authority to delegate to the national government power to regulate the [T]ribes directly” than they possessed authority to “delegate power to the federal government over other peoples who were not part of the federal union.” Clinton 2002, at 254; see also R. Barsh, Book Review, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Ed., 57 Wash. L. Rev. 799, 803 (1982).

As we have now seen, the Constitution reflected a carefully considered balance between tribal, state, and federal powers. That scheme predated the founding and it persisted long after. It is not, however, the balance this Court always maintained in the years since. More than a little fault for that fact lies with a doctrinal misstep. In the late 19th century, this Court misplaced the original meaning of