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32 But “[r]edressability requires that the court be able to afford relief through the exercise of its power, not through the persuasive or even awe-inspiring effect of the opinion explaining the exercise of its power.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 825 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U. S. 932, 937 (2011) (per curiam) (a judgment’s “possible, indirect benefit in a future lawsuit” does not preserve standing). Otherwise, redressability would be satisfied whenever a decision might persuade actors who are not before the court—contrary to Article III’s strict prohibition on “issuing advisory opinions.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4). It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an injury; thus it is the judgment, not the opinion, that demonstrates redressability. The individual petitioners can hope for nothing more than an opinion, so they cannot satisfy Article III.

Texas also lacks standing to challenge the placement preferences. It has no equal protection rights of its own, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 323 (1966), and it cannot assert equal protection claims on behalf of its citizens because “[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government,” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. ''Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez'', 458 U. S. 592, 610, n. 16 (1982). That should make the issue