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Rh put state legislatures and executives “under the direct control of Congress.” Murphy, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18). Rather, they are a logical consequence of our system of “dual sovereignty” in which state courts are required to apply federal law. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991).

Here, ICWA’s recordkeeping requirements are comparable in kind and in degree to the historical examples. Like the naturalization laws, §1951(a) requires the state court to transmit to the Secretary a copy of a court order along with basic demographic information. Section 1915(e) likewise requires the State to record a limited amount of information—the efforts made to comply with the placement preferences—and provide the information to the Secretary and to the child’s tribe. These duties are “ancillary” to the state court’s obligation to conduct child custody proceedings in compliance with ICWA. Printz, 521 U. S., at 908, n. 2. Thus, ICWA’s recordkeeping requirements are consistent with the Tenth Amendment.

Petitioners raise two additional claims: an equal protection challenge to ICWA’s placement preferences and a nondelegation challenge to the provision allowing tribes to alter the placement preferences. We do not reach the merits of these claims because no party before the Court has standing to raise them. Article III requires a plaintiff to show that she has suffered an injury in fact that is “ ‘fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’ ” California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 4). Neither the individual petitioners nor Texas can pass that test.

The individual petitioners argue that ICWA injures them by placing them on “[un]equal footing” with Indian parents