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Rh §1912—the notice requirement, expert witness requirement, and evidentiary standards—we doubt that requirements placed on a State as litigant implicate the Tenth Amendment. But in any event, these provisions, like §1912(d), apply to both private and state actors, so they too pose no anticommandeering problem.

Petitioners also raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to §1915, which dictates placement preferences for Indian children. According to petitioners, this provision orders state agencies to perform a “diligent search” for placements that satisfy ICWA’s hierarchy. Brief for Petitioner Texas 63; Reply Brief for Texas 24; see also Brief for Individual Petitioners 67–68. Petitioners assert that the Department of the Interior understands §1915 this way, 25 CFR §23.132(c)(5), and the Tribes who intervene in proceedings governed by ICWA share that understanding—for example, “the Librettis’ adoption of Baby O was delayed because the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe demanded that county officials exhaustively search for a placement with the Tribe first.” Reply Brief for Texas 24–25. Just as Congress cannot compel state officials to search databases to determine the lawfulness of gun sales, Printz, 521 U. S., at 902–904, petitioners argue, Congress cannot compel state officials to search for a federally preferred placement.

As an initial matter, this argument encounters the same problem that plagues petitioners with respect to §1912: Petitioners have not shown that the “diligent search” requirement, which applies to both private and public parties, demands the use of state sovereign authority. But this argument fails for another reason too: Section 1915 does not require anyone, much less the States, to search for alternative placements. As the United States emphasizes, petitioners’ interpretation “cannot be squared with this Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple,” which held that “ ‘there simply