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22 which only the State can rescue a child from neglectful parents. But §1912 applies to more than child neglect—for instance, it applies when a biological mother arranges for a private adoption without the biological father’s consent. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 570 U. S., at 643–644. And even when a child is trapped in an abusive home, the State is not necessarily the only option for rescue—for instance, a grandmother can seek guardianship of a grandchild whose parents are failing to care for her. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Eliza W., 304 Neb., at 996–997, 938 N. W. 2d, at 309–310. Petitioners do not distinguish between these varied situations, much less isolate a domain in which only the State can act. Some amici assert that, at the very least, removing children from imminent danger in the home falls exclusively to the government. Brief for Academy of Adoption and Assisted Reproduction Attorneys et al. as Amici Curiae 14 (“Amici are aware of no state in which a private actor may lawfully remove a child from his existing home”). Maybe so—but that does not help petitioners’ commandeering argument, because the “active efforts” requirement does not apply to emergency removals. §1922. If ICWA commandeers state performance of a “core sovereign function,” petitioners do not give us the details.

When a federal statute applies on its face to both private and state actors, a commandeering argument is a heavy lift—and petitioners have not pulled it off. Both state and private actors initiate involuntary proceedings. And, if there is a core of involuntary proceedings committed exclusively to the sovereign, Texas neither identifies its contours nor explains what §1912(d) requires of a State in that context. Petitioners have therefore failed to show that the “active efforts” requirement commands the States to deploy their executive or legislative power to implement federal Indian policy.

As for petitioners’ challenges to other provisions of