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20 Adoption of T. A. W., 186 Wash. 2d 828, 835–837, 850–851, 383 P. 3d 492, 494–495, 501–502 (2016) (en banc) (mother and stepfather); J. W. v. R. J., 951 P. 2d 1206, 1212–1213 (Alaska 1998) (same). Indeed, Texas’s own family code permits certain private parties to initiate suits for the termination of parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §102.003(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2022); see Reply Brief for Texas 27. And while petitioners treat “active efforts” as synonymous with “government programs,” state courts have applied the “active efforts” requirement in private suits too. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T. A. W., 186 Wash. 2d, at 851–852, 383 P. 3d, at 502–503; S. S. v. Stephanie H., 241 Ariz. 419, 424, 388 P. 3d 569, 574 (App. 2017); In re N. B., 199 P. 3d 16, 23–24 (Colo. App. 2007). That is consistent with ICWA’s findings, which describe the role that both public and private actors played in the unjust separation of Indian children from their families and tribes. §1901. Given all this, it is implausible that §1912(d) is directed primarily, much less exclusively, at the States.

Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and private actors does not typically implicate the Tenth Amendment. Murphy, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20). In South