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6 of the Federal Government.” Id., at 72. Even when we have sustained legislation, we have cautioned against congressional overreach. See Lara, 541 U. S., at 203–205. We have suggested that a law may exceed Congress’s power to regulate Indian affairs if it has “an unusual legislative objective,” brings about “radical changes in tribal status,” or “interfere[s] with the power or authority of any State.” Ibid.

We have rarely had occasion to enforce these limits, in part because the enactments before us have often fallen comfortably within the historical bounds of Congress’s enumerated powers. See (, dissenting). But that does not mean that we should shy away from enforcement when presented with a statute that exceeds what the Constitution allows.

Congress’s power in the area of Indian affairs cannot exceed the limits imposed by the “system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government” established by the Constitution. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991). “The powers delegated … to the federal government are few and defined,” while “[t]hose which … remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The powers retained by the States constitute “ ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’ ” secure against federal intrusion. Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison)). This structural principle, reinforced in the Tenth Amendment, “confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.” New York, 505 U. S., at 157. The corollary is also true: in some circumstances, the powers reserved to the States inform the scope of Congress’s power. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15). This includes in the