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Rh make sense to limit Kagama to that conceptual root, treating regulations of tribal lands and tribal governments as “external” to the normal affairs of the Nation.

Indeed, such a line explains almost all of the myriad cases that respondents have cataloged as showing an unqualified power over Indian affairs. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 789 (2014) (tribal government’s sovereign immunity); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 299, 308 (1902) (federal approval of mining leases on tribal lands); Stephens, 174 U. S., at 476–477 (federal court in Indian territory). Many, for example, dealt with federal laws that purported to diminish a tribe’s territory or jurisdiction. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S. 329 (1998); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U. S. 99 (1993); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979); United States v. Hellard, 322 U. S. 363 (1944). Others dealt with state taxes on Indian lands. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163 (1989); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976); Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912). Others still have permitted the Federal Government to diminish a tribe’s self-government. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 56–57. And yet others, in Kagama’s direct lineage, dealt with crimes on Indian lands. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U. S., at 200; see also, e.g., United States v. Cooley, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 1); Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 323–324.

In doing so, some of those criminal law cases reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits separate punishments by tribal governments and the Federal Government because of the tribe’s separate sovereignty, underscoring Kagama’s conceptual root. See, e.g., Cooley, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); Lara, 541 U. S., at 200. And, along the way, at least some of these cases clarified, like Kagama,