Page:Haaland v. Brackeen.pdf/106

24 But that authority is a foreign, not domestic, affairs power. It comprehends external relations, like matters of war, peace, and diplomacy—not internal affairs like adoption proceedings. The Court made that point explicit in Curtiss-Wright: The “power over external affairs [is] in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs.” 299 U. S., at 319; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635, n. 2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion of Court) (recognizing this distinction). For external affairs, the Constitution grants the Federal Government a wider authority; but for internal affairs, the Constitution provides fewer, more discrete powers. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 315, 319; Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 34–35 (opinion of ).

Again, all those limits dovetail with the historical practices of the Founding era. As discussed above, the Founding-era Government undertook a wide array of measures with respect to Indian tribes. But, apart from measures dealing with commerce, most (if not all) of the Federal Government’s actions toward Indians either treated them as sovereign entities or regulated citizens on Indian lands who might threaten to breach treaties with Indians or otherwise disrupt the peace. For example, early treaties that dealt