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20 a single object—“Commerce”—that is then cabined by three prepositional phrases: “with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Accordingly, one would naturally read the term “Commerce” as having the same meaning with respect to each type of “Commerce” the Clause proceeds to identify. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 74 (1824). I would think that is how we would read, for example, the President’s “appoint[ment]” power with respect to “Ambassadors, … Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2. There is no textual reason why the Commerce Clause would be different. Nor have the parties or the numerous amici presented any evidence that the Founders thought that the term “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause meant different things for Indian tribes than it did for commerce between States. See S. Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1149, 1161–1162 (2003).

Rather, the evidence points in the opposite direction. See Adoptive Couple, 570 U. S., at 659–660 (, concurring). When discussing “commerce” with Indian tribes, the Founders plainly meant buying and selling goods and transportation for that purpose. For example, President Washington once informed Congress of the need for “new channels for the commerce of the Creeks,” because “their trade is liable to be interrupted” by conflicts with England. Statement to the Senate (Aug. 4, 1790), reprinted in 4 American State Papers 80. Henry Knox similarly referred to the “profits of this commerce” with the Creeks in the context of a “trading house which has the monopoly of the trade of the Creeks.” Report (July 6, 1789), reprinted in id., at 15. And President Jefferson likewise discussed the “commerce [that] shall be carried on liberally” at “trading houses” with Indians. Statement to Congress (Jan. 18,