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18 one Indian-specific power, there is simply no reason to think that there is some sort of free-floating, unlimited power over all things related to Indians. That is common sense: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. And that is particularly true here, because the Founders adopted the “Indian Commerce Clause” while rejecting an arguably broader authority over “Indian affairs.” See Adoptive Couple, 570 U. S., at 662. Accordingly, here as elsewhere, the Federal Government can exercise only its constitutionally enumerated powers. Because each of those powers contains its own inherent limits, none of them can support an additional unbounded power over all Indian-related matters. Indeed, the history of the plenary power doctrine in Indian law shows that, from its inception, it has been a power in search of a constitutional basis—and the majority opinion shows that this is still the case.

As the majority notes, some of the candidates that this Court has suggested as the source of the “plenary power” are the Treaty Clause, the Commerce Clause, and “principles inherent in the Constitution’s structure.” See ; Lara, 541 U. S., at 200. But each of those powers has clear, inherent limits, and not one suggests any sort of unlimited power over Indian affairs—much less a power to regulate U. S. citizens outside of Indian lands merely because those individuals happen to be Indians. I will discuss each in turn.

First, and most obviously, the Treaty Clause confers only the power to “make Treaties”; the Supremacy Clause then makes those treaties the supreme law of the land. Art. II, §2, cl. 2; Art. VI. Even under our most expansive Treaty Clause precedents, this power is still limited to actual treaties. See Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 854–855