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Rh other members of the Court agreed, in HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee (No 1) (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336.”

57. In his judgment in KSAR v Lee Ming Tee (No 1), Sir Anthony Mason NPJ addressed the scope of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure:

“The prosecution’s duty is to disclose to the defence relevant material (including information) which may undermine its case or advance the defence case. The duty is not limited to the disclosure of admissible evidence. Information not itself admissible may lead by a train of inquiry to evidence which is admissible: Reg v. Preston at 163–164, per Lord Mustill. And material which is not admissible may be relevant and useful for cross-examination of a prosecution witness on credit.

The Melvin categories may be accepted as a broad statement of what, on a sensible appraisal by the prosecutor, is subject to disclosure. The Melvin formulation and the recognition that the credibility of a prosecution witness is relevant for the purpose of the Melvin categories have the consequence that disclosable material relevant to the cross-examination of a prosecution witness cannot be restricted to the three instances of disclosable material relevant to the credibility of a prosecution witness sanctioned by authority and referred to by Steyn LJ in Brown [1994] 1 WLR at 1607A-C. It extends to other significant material which a reasonable jury could regard as tending to shake confidence in the credibility of the witness.”

58. Of the ambit of the term “prosecution”, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ said:

“The duty rests with the prosecution or prosecuting counsel. The duty should be considered as one imposed upon the prosecution generally (so in this case it was the DOJ), though it is generally