Page:HCF v The Queen.pdf/35

Edelman J Steward J

The Jury Act contains a number of provisions designed to protect the integrity of the jury system. For example, pursuant to s 54, a person cannot communicate with any juror whilst the jury is being "kept together" (save in certain exceptional cases). Pursuant to s 56, a judge may, amongst other things, discharge a juror (without the need to discharge the entire jury) if it appears to that judge "that the juror is not impartial or ought not, for other reasons" be allowed to act as a juror, or becomes incapable of continuing to act as a juror. Pursuant to s 60(1), if a jury cannot agree on a verdict, or the judge considers there are "other proper reasons" for discharging the jury, then the judge may discharge the jury without giving a verdict. Pursuant to s 69A(1), a juror in a criminal trial must not inquire about the defendant until the jury has given its verdict or the juror is discharged by the judge. Pursuant to s 70(2), a person must not publish to the public "jury information" (defined, relevantly, in s 70(17) to refer to information about statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast, in the course of a jury's deliberations). Pursuant to s 70(3), a person must not seek from a juror the disclosure of jury information, and pursuant to s 70(4), a juror must not disclose jury information if it is likely to be, or will be, published to the public. An exception to s 70(2)–(4) exists where the disclosure is made to the court "to the extent necessary for the proper performance of the jury's functions". Pursuant to s 70(7), if there are grounds to suspect that a person may have been guilty of "bias, fraud or an offence" relating to that person's membership of a jury or performance of functions as a member of a jury, the court may authorise an investigation of that matter and, for that purpose, seek disclosure of jury information. If a member of a jury holds an equivalent suspicion about a fellow jury member, that person may disclose that suspicion to the Attorney-General or to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Putting to one side those directions by a trial judge that might be described as purely administrative, or concerning matters that might be regarded as more trivial, the foregoing provisions reflect the vital importance of the directions of the trial judge in ensuring that the jury system works with integrity. That was the case with the directions given by the trial judge here.

The trial judge told the jurors not to "get on the internet and look anybody up" and not to look up "legal principles", which direction was emphasised by the phrase "[d]on't do it". These were clear directions about matters designed to maintain the integrity of the jury system. Indeed, the trial judge gave several directions about not conducting "your own research on any matters of law". The same observation may be made about the trial judge's direction that if one member of the jury were to disobey a direction, the other jurors were to give a note to the