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, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This does not require a plaintiff to identify an earlier decision that is “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting , 563 U.S. at 741). “[T]his narrow definition of ‘clearly established’ functions to protect ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”, 864 F.3d 416, 424 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting , 136 S. Ct. at 308). It also serves to protect “reasonable” but “mistaken” decisions by officials acting in good faith. , 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).

Once the defense is raised, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show “that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”, 563 U.S. at 735 (citing , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Plaintiffs have not met that burden here, although they attempt to do so in two ways.

First, Plaintiffs argue that qualified immunity is inappropriate based upon because they “made their speech as private citizens (rather than professors at a university), and spoke about a matter of public concern (racism).” (Doc. No. 81 at 15–16). In, while “the Supreme Court clearly established that racial discrimination is inherently a matter of public concern,” , 209 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir. 2000), it did not establish that all speech by public employees touching upon matters of public concern is always acceptable. To the contrary, “[b]ecause of the enormous variety of fact situations,” the Supreme Court found it “[n]either appropriate [n]or feasible to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.”, 461 U.S. at 154. Indeed, a number of circuits have found that constitutional rights requiring a particularized balancing test will rarely be “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes. , ,