Page:Gruber v. Bruce.pdf/19

 difficult to do.’”, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007). It was reasonable for TTU to believe that, absent disciplinary action, Plaintiffs’ speech would (1) disrupt its ability to fulfill its core mission of teaching students, given a university’s “strong interest in preventing … speech that rises to the level of harassment,”, 241 F.3d at 824; (2) undercut its ability to enforce internal policies relating to employee conduct and free speech; and (3) diminish its obligation to protect all students’ freedom of speech and a free marketplace of ideas.

Ultimately, “[t]he problem in any case,” just as it is here, “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”, 391 U.S. at 568. “Although such particularized balancing is difficult, [we] must reach the most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.”, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. 1684. That balance tips in favor of Dr. Bruce and TTU and summary judgment will be granted in her favor on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim. “Qualified immunity shields government officials in the performance of discretionary functions from standing trial for civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights.”, 796 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2015). “[C]learly established law should not be defined at a ‘high level of generality’—it ‘must be particularized to the facts of the case.’”
 * B.