Page:Gruber v. Bruce.pdf/17

 he led was not merely personal, nor was it a quotidian workplace grievance. Accordingly, it is to the that balancing test that the Court now turns.

Balancing interests must begin with the fundamental notion that there is a “robust tradition of academic freedom in our nation's post-secondary schools.”, 260 F.3d at 679. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). Because “a professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting,”, 241 F.3d at 823, “professors at public universities retain First Amendment protections at least when engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship.” , 992 F.3d at 505.

The paeans to academic freedom and free speech do not give faculty members a license to violate university rules without consequences, however. “It goes without saying that a university has an interest in fostering a collegial educational environment while doing everything within its power to maintain its reputation in the academic community both on campus and around the nation.”, 319 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2003); , 241 F.3d at 822 (“A college’s or university’s interest in maintaining a hostile-free learning environment … is well recognized.”). Hence, the First Amendment does not require public employers to tolerate every type of personal attack against others, even when the attack touches upon a matter of public concern. Instead, “[i]f the manner and content of an employee’s speech is demeaning, disrespectful, rude, and insulting, and is perceived that way in the workplace, the government employer is within its discretion to take disciplinary action.”, 679 F. App’x 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2017).