Page:Gruber v. Bruce.pdf/15

 (1) whether the statement in question constitutes speech on a matter of public concern; and (if so) (2) whether the plaintiffs interest in making such speech outweigh the employer’s interest “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”, 979 F.3d at 526 (citing , 228 F.3d at 737). Again, Dr. Bruce insists Plaintiffs have met neither element.

With respect to the first sub-element, Dr. Bruce argues that the speech at issue was not a matter of public concern because the flyer was the result of a personal grievance Plaintiffs had with Dr. Donadio. Alternatively, she argues they had a “beef” with the school and that is why they spoke. The Court is unpersuaded by either argument.

Since at least, the Supreme Court has instructed courts not to “constitutionalize” employee grievances, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. 1684, so as to avoid “compromis[ing] the proper functioning of government offices.”, 543 U.S. 77, 82, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004). “[T]he quintessential employee beef [is that] management has acted incompetently.”, 695 F.3d 531, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2012). Similarly, interpersonal squabbles—not being matters of public concern—are not constitutionally protected. , 674 F. App’x 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2016);, 679 F.3d 443, 449–50 (6th Cir. 2012).

As a personal matter, Plaintiffs were not pleased that Dr. Donadio applauded the school board’s decision not to consider changing the name of the mascot at Algood Middle School. And, as faculty members, they were not happy that TTU allowed TPUSA onto campus. These undisputed facts do not mean, perforce, that theirs was simply a personal or employment grievance and not a matter of public concern.

“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined