Page:Groff v. DeJoy.pdf/9

4 the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale.” Id., at 175. Judge Hardiman dissented, concluding that adverse “effects on USPS employees in Lancaster or Holtwood” did not alone suffice to show the needed hardship “on the employer’s business.” Id., at 177 (emphasis in original).

We granted Groff’s ensuing petition for a writ of certiorari. 598 U. S. ___ (2023).

Because this case presents our first opportunity in nearly 50 years to explain the contours of Hardison, we begin by recounting the legal backdrop to that case, including the development of the Title VII provision barring religious discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) regulations and guidance regarding that prohibition. We then summarize how the Hardison case progressed to final decision, and finally, we discuss how courts and the EEOC have understood its significance. This background helps to explain the clarifications we offer today.

Since its passage, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has made it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, because of such individual’s … religion.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) (1964 ed.). As originally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by discrimination “because of … religion,” but shortly after the statute’s passage, the EEOC interpreted that provision to mean that employers were sometimes required to “accommodate” the “reasonable religious needs of employees.” 29 CFR § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). After some tinkering, the EEOC settled on a formulation