Page:Groff v. DeJoy.pdf/15

10 the routine application of a bona fide seniority system [is] not … unlawful under Title VII.’ ” 432 U. S., at 82 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977)). Invoking these authorities, the Court found that the statute did not require an accommodation that involuntarily deprived employees of seniority rights. 432 U. S., at 80.

Applying this interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s evaluation of the factual record, the Court identified no way in which TWA, without violating seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardison’s request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath. The Court found that not enough co-workers were willing to take Hardison’s shift voluntarily, that compelling them to do so would have violated their seniority rights, and that leaving the Stores Department short-handed would have adversely affected its “essential” mission. Id., at 68, 80.

The Court also rejected two other options offered in Justice Marshall’s dissent: (1) paying other workers overtime wages to induce them to work on Saturdays and making up for that increased cost by requiring Hardison to work overtime for regular wages at other times and (2) forcing TWA to pay overtime for Saturday work for three months, after which, the dissent thought, Hardison could transfer back to the night shift in Building 1. The Court dismissed both of these options as not “feasible,” id., at 83, n. 14, but it provided no explanation for its evaluation of the first. In dissent, Justice Marshall suggested one possible reason: that the collective bargaining agreement might have disallowed Hardison’s working overtime for regular wages. Id., at 95 (dissenting opinion). But the majority did not embrace that explanation.