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2 they were willing to give time and trouble to the consideration of difficulties and not to accentuate the differences that arose.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe, because there has been little time and there has been a disposition, at any rate in some quarters, on which I will not dwell, to force things rapidly to an issue—at any rate to the great risk of war—and we know that the result of that is that the policy of peace, as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, has failed. I do not want to dwell upon that and to comment upon it, or to say where blame seems to us to lie, and which Powers were most in favour of peace, or which were most disposed to risk or to endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach the crisis in which we are from the point of view of British interests, British honour [loud Opposition cheers], British obligations [renewed cheers], and free from all passion. We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace, and when these papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our own efforts for peace were, and they will enable people to form their own judgment upon what forces were at work which operated against peace.

Now I come first to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House, and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once, that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be [cheers]; that we would have no secret engagement [cheers] to spring upon the House and should not tell the House that because we had entered upon that engagement there was an obligation of honour on the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups—the Triple Alliance, and what came to be called the Triple Entente—for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an Alliance; it was a diplomatic group. [Hear, hear.] The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—which originated in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, happened to come to London—his visit had been planned before the crisis broke out—and I told him definitely then that this being a Balkan affair I did