Page:Gory v Kolver (CC).djvu/32

VAN HEERDEN AJ would have to be heard and resolved in separate proceedings before another court. This would obviously be a most undesirable state of affairs, undermining the achievement of finality for the parties and resulting in an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.

It follows that the issues raised by Mr Kolver in his application for leave to appeal against the ancillary orders made by the High Court contained in paragraphs 9.1, 9.2, 10 and 11 of the High Court order are, at the very least, “issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters”, in terms of section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution and fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. The same would of course apply to the orders contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the High Court order.

It may well be that the matters to which the orders set out in paragraphs 4 to 11 of the High Court order relate fall within the jurisdiction of this Court as “constitutional matters” in terms of section 167(3)(b). These orders were made by the High Court, in the exercise of its powers in terms of section 172(1) of the Constitution, as a direct consequence of the declaration of invalidity made in respect of section 1(1) of the Act and in the interests of justice and equity. In making these orders, the High Court was in every sense controlling the consequences of the declaration of invalidity. As was stated by this Court in Dawood and Another; Shalabi and Another; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others: “[I]t is not only the direct order of unconstitutionality itself that must be confirmed but all the orders made by the High Court that flowed from that finding of unconstitutionality. . . All of these orders granted relief consequent upon the finding