Page:Gohmert v. Pence (6 20-cv-660-JDK) (2021) Order.pdf/9

 Further weighing against Congressman Gohmert’s standing here is the speculative nature of the alleged injury. “To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (alleged injury cannot be “conjectural” or “hypothetical”). “Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).

Here, Congressman Gohmert’s alleged injury requires a series of hypothetical—but by no means certain—events. Plaintiffs presuppose what the Vice President will do on January 6, which electoral votes the Vice President will count or reject from contested states, whether a Representative and a Senator will object under Section 15 of the Electoral Count Act, how each member of the House and Senate will vote on any such objections, and how each state delegation in the House would potentially vote under the Twelfth Amendment absent a majority electoral vote. All that makes Congressman Gohmert’s alleged injury far too uncertain to support standing under Article III. Id. at 414 (“We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.”).