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Rh to walk out at 8 a.m. “because by that time all employees would have reported to work and [the employer] would be in full operation with its largest number of chickens on the line.” Lumbee Farms Co-op., 285 N. L. R. B. 497, 503 (1987). The Board affirmed the ALJ’s reasoning that “[t]he fact that the strike occurred during the workday when chickens were on the line and vulnerable to loss does not mean employees automatically lost protection under the Act,” because “[s]trikers are not required under the Act to institute the strike at a specific time of day.” Id., at 506. Indeed, it is “[n]orma[l]” for “planned employee strikes [to be] timed to ensure the greatest impact on an employer.” Ibid.

The Board has applied this same reasoning in cases involving, for example, cheese and milk. See Leprino Cheese Co., 170 N. L. R. B. 601, 605 (1968); Central Okla. Milk Producers Assn., 125 N. L. R. B. 419, 435 (1959). In those cases, the Board also explained that the reasonable-precautions principle is “limited to situations involving a danger of ‘aggravated’ injury to persons or premises”—a danger “[o]bviously” not posed by the loss of, for example, cheese. Leprino Cheese, 170 N. L. R. B., at 607 (emphasis added). The Board has consistently reiterated that “[l]oss is not uncommon when a strike occurs.” Central Okla. Milk Producers, 125 N. L. R. B., at 435.

In short, it is indisputable that workers have a statutory right to strike despite the fact that exercising that right risks economic harm to employers. Congress has, in effect, drawn a line between those economic harms that are inherent in the act of peacefully walking off the job (which do not render the strike unprotected), and those that result from workers taking subsequent affirmative steps to seize the employer’s premises or engage in acts of violence (strike conduct that is not protected by the NLRA). The Board has further recognized a narrow duty that arises if a sudden