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18 that power to demand improvement of employees’ wages and working conditions—goals that, according to Congress, benefit the economy writ large. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U. S., at 190.

Still, the right to strike is, of course, not unlimited. But when “Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did so by prescribing the limits and conditions of the abridgment in exacting detail.” Erie Resistor, 373 U. S., at 234. Section 8 enumerates several limitations. For example, a union must notify an employer that it intends to terminate or modify its contract—and thus that a strike is possible—at least 60 days before striking. §158(d). A union cannot strike for unlawful purposes, such as putting economic pressure on parties other than the primary employer. §158(b)(4)(i)(B). And, in certain healthcare settings, unions must provide at least 10 days’ notice of the precise date and time of a strike. §158(g).

Additionally, §163 of the NLRA (which Congress added via the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, 61 Stat. 151) states that “nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”

Thus, the text of the NLRA allows for only two kinds of limitations on the right to strike: those enumerated in the Act itself, and the “limitations or qualifications” on the right that existed when the Taft-Hartley Amendments were enacted. See NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 281–282 (1960). The only relevant limitation here is the one set out in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939).