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10 12, 2023, an ALJ denied Glacier’s motion to postpone the ALJ hearing on the General Counsel’s complaint pending this Court’s decision in this case. As the ALJ explained, the General Counsel’s pleading “constituted a determination that the strikers’ conduct was at least arguably protected by [the NLRA] and that this agency became the exclusive forum for adjudicating whether the strikers’ conduct was protected.” A nine-day hearing ensued, and the parties completed posthearing briefing last week. We have said that “the need for protecting the exclusivity of [the Board’s] jurisdiction is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process of litigation through procedures originating in the Board.” Marine Engineers, 370 U. S., at 185. That is exactly the situation here.

For these reasons, I believe that the filing of the General Counsel’s complaint is more than sufficient to trigger Garmon’s pause, and that it must be so if consistency with Congress’s intent to give the Board primary authority to interpret and enforce the NLRA is to be maintained. In circumstances like these, “the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 245. And this Court is no exception. Because the General Counsel has now filed a complaint with the Board concerning the labor dispute at issue in this case, all courts—including this one—should stand down.

The majority does not take issue with my conclusion that the General Counsel’s complaint triggers a Garmon hiatus; instead, it takes no position on the matter, leaving the question open for the Washington courts to decide on remand.