Page:Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters.pdf/20

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, with whom and  join, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Washington Supreme Court erred in holding that Glacier Northwest’s complaint is preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the right to strike, but that right is subject to certain limitations and qualifications, see 29 U. S. C. §163, and this Court’s decisions make clear that the Act does not protect striking employees who engage in the type of conduct alleged here.

This Court has long recognized that the Act does not “invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer’s property.” NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 255 (1939). To justify “despoiling [an employer’s] property” or “the seizure and conversion of its goods,” we have reasoned, “would be to put a premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies.” Id., at 253. It follows that Garmon preemption does not prevent States from imposing liability on employees who intentionally destroy their employer’s property. See, e.g., Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 136 (1976) (“Policing … destruction of property has been